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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a scenario where an employee with diabetes requests breaks
in order to monitor and maintain his blood sugar levels. The employer denies
this request. The employee is never able to use his meter at work and is not
allowed to eat or drink on the plant floor. As a result, the employee suffers
hypoglycemic attacks at work causing him to collapse and altering his
capacity to think clearly and act appropriately. The employer admits that it
reasonably failed to accommodate the employee. Does this employee state a
claim if he did not suffer a resulting adverse employment action, i.e. a

*
Megan I. Brennan is an associate at Nichols Kaster, PLLP. I am grateful to my
husband, John Brennan, and my colleagues, Steven Andrew Smith, Esq., Adam Hansen, Esq.
and paralegals Ashlee Wendt and Heather O’Neil, for their insightful comments and
assistance with editing this article.
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material change in terms or conditions of employment (for example a
demotion or termination)?1
This article argues that the answer should be a resounding yes.
Failure to accommodate claims should not be analyzed using the disparate
treatment prima facie standard, as some courts have done. 2 Rather,
consistent with the text, structure, and remedial purpose of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(“ADA”), the failure to reasonably accommodate is in and of itself a form of
discrimination in violation of the ADA. 3 Respectfully, courts that insist
otherwise are plain wrong.
The question of whether a plaintiff must suffer an adverse action in a
failure to accommodate claim has been frequently overlooked in the past.
However, the issue is bound to become more prevalent given the employeefriendly changes to the ADA in the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), which became effective January 1, 2009,4
and the recent upward trend in the number of ADA charges of discrimination
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).5 It is
crucial to bring clarity to this point of law.
1

2003).

The facts are taken from Nawrot v. CPC Int’l., 259 F. Supp. 2d 716 (N.D. Ill.

2

Whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies at all, or in modified form,
to failure to accommodate disability cases is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion
of such, see Aaron Matthew Laing, Failure to Accommodate, Discriminatory Intent, and the
McDonnell Douglas Framework: Distinguishing the Analyses of Claims Arising Under
Subparts (a) and (b) of S 12112(b)(5) of the ADA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 913 (2002); U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_38_ (explaining the
burdens of proof for an individual with a disability (plaintiff) and an employer (defendant) in
an ADA lawsuit alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation) (citing US Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002)); see also Peebles v. Potter, 354
F.3d 761, 765–69 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying “a modified burden-shifting analysis” to plaintiff’s
reasonable accommodation claim).
3
Throughout this article the references to “failure to accommodate” claims
pertain to claims under § 12112(b)(5)(A), not to claims under § 12112(b)(5)(B), which
involve denying employment opportunity to avoid providing a reasonable accommodation.
4
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008);
see U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Notice Concerning The Americans With
Disabilities
Act
(ADA)
Amendments
Act
of
2008,
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/adaaa_notice.cfm (last visited April 23, 2012).
5
For four consecutive years after the ADAAA was passed, the percentage of
charges filed including a disability claim rose from the prior fiscal year. Annual EEOC
Statistics reported at eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm. In fiscal year
2012, 26.5% of all charges included a disability claim. Id. In fact, the EEOC’s enforcement of
the ADA in fiscal year 2011 “produced the highest increase in monetary relief among all of
the statutes: the administrative relief obtained for disability discrimination charges increased
by almost 35.9 percent to $103.4 million compared to $76.1 million in the previous fiscal
year.” Press Release, EEOC, Private Sector Bias Charges Hit All-Time High (Jan. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-24-12a.cfm.
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The first section of this article explains the dispute and confusion
surrounding what elements are required to establish a failure to
accommodate claim under the ADA. The second section will explain that the
language of the ADA supports the conclusion that an adverse employment
action is unnecessary to state a claim of discrimination based on the failure to
reasonably accommodate an employee. The third section will address how
the EEOC’s guidance suggests that no separate adverse employment action is
necessary for such claims. The fourth section will analyze case law
addressing whether an adverse action is needed. Finally, section five will
explore the public policy reasons behind recognizing a failure to
accommodate disability prima facie case that does not include an adverse
employment action prong.
II. CONFUSION REGARDING ELEMENTS OF A FAILURE TO
ACCOMMODATE CLAIM
42 U.S.C. § 12112 includes a “General rule” regarding
discrimination against persons with disabilities.6 It states:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. 7
The construction of the phrase “discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability” is explained in the following section.8
The subsections thereunder explain various forms of prohibited
discrimination, including:
[N]ot making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity[.]9
Confusion arises because the failure to accommodate is not “discrimination”
as the concept is traditionally understood.

6
7
8
9

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Id.
§ 12112(b).
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
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There are various types of discrimination claims that disabled
employees may pursue when proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 12112, including
disparate treatment, hostile work environment,10 disparate impact,11 and the
failure to reasonably accommodate. Disparate treatment and retaliation
claims are the ones most easily confused with failure to accommodate
claims.12
The United States Supreme Court explained that “‘[d]isparate
treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected characteristics].” 13 The
elements of a prima facie case disparate treatment claim under the ADA,
although varying slightly from court to court, generally include proof that the
individual: (1) is disabled, as defined by the ADA; (2) is "qualified," i.e., can
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because
of the disability. 14 In a disparate treatment discrimination case under the
ADA, an adverse employment action is one that causes a material change in
the terms or conditions of employment.15
To establish a failure to accommodate claim, the plaintiff must show
he: (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the employer is
subject to the ADA and on notice of the disability and need for the
accommodation; and (3) that the employee could perform the essential

10
Lanman v. Johnson Cnty., Kans., 393 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a hostile work environment claim is actionable under the ADA).
11
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (disparate impact discrimination includes “using
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities…”).
12
See e.g., Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1125–26 (7th Cir.
2006) (plaintiff waived potential failure to accommodate claim by labeling and analyzing it as
a disparate treatment claim); Pagliaroni v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 04-C-1213, 2006 WL
2668157, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2006) (rejecting argument that employer’s failure to
accommodate employee’s disability can be considered retaliation).
13
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting Teamsters v. U.S.,
431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977)). In Raytheon Co., the Court vacated and remanded the case
because the Ninth Circuit improperly applied a disparate-impact analysis to the employee’s
disparate-treatment claim. Id. at 55.
14
Kurtis A. Kemper, What Constitutes “Constructive Discharge” Under
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 609 (2002); see
e.g., Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995).
15
See Brown v. Cox, 286 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002). As with Title VII
claims brought under the substantive antidiscrimination provision, plaintiffs alleging
discrimination under the ADA must show an “ultimate employment” action. Williams v.
Brunswick Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (E.D.N.C. 2010); see Doe v. Dekalb
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1453 (11th Cir. 1998) (looking to Title VII to interpret
adverse action in ADA discrimination case). Title VII’s substantive antidiscrimination
provision is limited to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace,
such as discharge or a material change in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–62 (2006).
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functions of the position with a reasonable accommodation.16 However, there
is a split amongst the courts regarding the remaining elements.17 Some courts
only require one additional element -- a showing that the defendant failed to
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff.18 On the other hand, certain courts
mandate that the plaintiff also prove that he suffered an adverse employment
action.19 In other circuits, it remains unclear whether an adverse action is
necessary to state a claim.20 The dispute and confusion is attributable, at least
in part, to parties and courts failing to clearly differentiate between disparate
treatment and failure to accommodate claims.21 Although disparate treatment
16
Elizabeth O’Connor Tomlinson, Cause of Action for Failure to Make
Reasonable in Workplace Under Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 Causes of Action 137, §
4 (updated Aug. 2011).
17
See infra text accompanying notes 18, 19, and 20.
18
Mzyk v. N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 F. App’x 13, 16 (5th Cir. 2010); E.E.O.C.
v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2010); Drozdowski v. Northland Lincoln
Mercury, 321 F. App’x 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2009); Spielman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Kan., Inc., 33 F. App’x 439, 443 (10th Cir. 2002); Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11
(4th Cir. 2001); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).
19
Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that in order to
establish a “failure to accommodate” claim, plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered an adverse
employment action because of his disability); Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr.,
675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012) (reiterating Allen); see Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm’t,
Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that, in reasonable accommodation cases, the
plaintiff must show that the disability caused the adverse employment action); Marshall v.
Federal Exp. Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating, “As the language of §
12112(a) makes clear, for discrimination (including denial of reasonable accommodation) to
be actionable, it must occur in regard to some adverse personnel decision or other term or
condition of employment” and finding “there is no adverse action before us with any nexus to
a possible denial of reasonable accommodation.”).
20
See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 101–102 (1st Cir.
2007) (stating final element as “[the defendant], despite knowing of [the plaintiff]'s disability,
did not reasonably accommodate it.”); cf. Colon-Fontanez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660
F.3d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the final prong is “the employer took an adverse
employment action against her because of the alleged disability”); see Myers v. Cuyahoga
Cnty., Ohio, 182 F. App'x 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2006) (listing final two elements as “she
requested an accommodation; and [ ] the employer failed to provide the necessary
accommodation”); cf. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1107, 1109
(6th Cir. 2008) (requiring plaintiff, who alleged defendants’ failure to accommodate her
disability was the impetus for her involuntary resignation, to show that she suffered an adverse
employment action due to her disability); see Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R. Co., 327 F.3d
707, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that last element is plaintiff “suffered an adverse employment
action as a result of the disability.”); cf. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766–67 (8th Cir.
2004) (acknowledging the “failure to make reasonable accommodations in the employment of
a disabled employee is a separate form of prohibited discrimination” and “[i]n a reasonable
accommodation case, the “discrimination” is framed in terms of the failure to fulfill an
affirmative duty-the failure to reasonably accommodate the disabled individual’s
limitations.”).
21
For example, in Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1125–26 (7th
Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff waived any potential failure to accommodate
employment claim by calling his claim a disparate treatment claim, analyzing it as a disparate
treatment claim, and by crafting only a disparate treatment claim in opposing summary
judgment. Likewise, in Pagliaroni v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 04-C-1213, 2006 WL
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and the failure to accommodate may sometimes coexist,22 they are different
types of discrimination. Sometimes this critical distinction gets lost in the
analysis. This confusion must stop.
Failure to accommodate claims are also sometimes erroneously
confused with retaliation claims. The ADA prohibits an employer from
retaliating “against any individual because such individual has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].”23 In a retaliation case under the
ADA, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) he engaged in a
protected activity; (2) his employer acted adversely against him;24 and (3) his
protected activity was causally connected to her employer's adverse action.25
A disabled employee’s request for an accommodation is considered a
protected activity.26 However, the failure to accommodate an employee’s
2668157, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2006), the court noted that although both parties presented
adverse employment action as an element of the claim, the plaintiff is not required to prove
such adverse action to be entitled to relief under the ADA. Similarly, in Hawkins v. Dale Med.
Ctr., 1:05 CV 540 SRW, 2006 WL 1537228, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Ala. May 31, 2006), the court
treated the count as a failure to accommodate termination claim because it was worded
unclearly in plaintiff’s complaint, defendant treated it as such and plaintiff did not object to
such characterization in response to summary judgment. Moreover, in Wade v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (E.D. Wis. 2006), the court rejected
defendant’s argument plaintiff was required to show she suffered an adverse action as part of
her failure to accommodate disability prima facie case, and noted that regardless, the
argument was waived by defendant because it was not repeated in its reply brief.
22
See, e.g., Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir.
2000) (“Failing to provide an employee with reasonable accommodations can tend to prove
that the employer also acted adversely against the employee because of the individual’s
disability.”).
23
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)); see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 2012 WL 75047 (January 11, 2012) (recognizing retaliation claims
under the ADA, but holding the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment bar such actions by a minister against her church).
24
See Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255, 1266 (10th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing adoption of Burlington N.’s Title VII retaliation standard in the ADA retaliation
context). The Supreme Court has stated that “the antiretaliation provision [in Title VII], unlike
the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 64. Instead, a plaintiff may satisfy the
requirement of adverse employment action under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision by
showing that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (quotations omitted).
25
Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535
U.S. 933 (2002); see also Tabatchnik v. Cont’l Airlines, 262 Fed. App’x. 674, 676 (5th Cir.
2008); Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Co., 331 F.3d 166, 177 (1st Cir. 2003); Salitros v. Chrysler
Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 2002); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500
(3rd Cir. 1997).
26
Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ. of Rockford Pub. Sch., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir.
2006); Wright v. COMPUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003); Heisler v. Metro.
Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp., Inc., 318 F.3d
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disability is not considered retaliation. If it were, all failure to accommodate
claims would also be retaliation claims.27
In short, adverse employment actions are needed to establish
disparate treatment and retaliation claims under the ADA. A failure to
accommodate claim may be successful absent an adverse action.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE ADA’S DISCRIMINATION
STATUTE
In exploring the issue of whether a failure to accommodate
necessitates an adverse action, an overview of the ADA’s discrimination
statute is essential. As discussed below, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
did not directly address whether an adverse action is needed to state a failure
to accommodate claim. A careful reading of the statute in its entirety reveals
that an adverse action was not and is not a requirement.
Before the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, the “General rule,”
Section 12112(a) used to state:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.28
It was argued that the phrase “because of” in this section meant that
an adverse action was a necessary element of a failure to accommodate
claim, just like all other types of ADA claims.29 However, at least one court
declined to adopt such a literal reading of the ADA.30 It pointed out that not
only would such a reading be contrary to the purposes of the reasonable
accommodation requirement, it would also be illogical given that some of the
subsections of Section 12112(b) already contain the phrase “because of”, and
hence do not rely on the “because of” language supplied in Section 12112(a),
while other subsections do not.31
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 revised Section 12112(a) by
striking “with a disability because of the disability of such individual” and

183, 191 (3rd Cir. 2003); Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir.
2001); Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2001).
27
Pagliaroni v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 04-C-1213, 2006 WL 2668157, at
*8–*9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2006).
28
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
29
Nawrot, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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inserting “on the basis of disability” in its place. 32 Unfortunately, the
decision to strike the “because of” language in that section, did not eliminate
the controversy. The revision was not an effort by Congress to clarify
whether an adverse employment action is needed for failure to accommodate
claims. Instead, the Congressional Record notes that the change was made to
“ensure[] that the emphasis in questions of disability discrimination is
properly on the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has been
discriminated against on the basis of disability, and not unduly focused on
the preliminary question of whether a particular person is a “person with a
disability.” 33 The Congressional Record also explains that the amendment
“mirror[s] the structure of the nondiscrimination protection provision in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”34 Thus, the debate continues on the
proper interpretation of Sections 12112(a) and (b) as it pertains to reasonable
accommodation claims.
Some defendants and courts have advocated for a tortured reading of
these sections, concluding that a failure to accommodate claim must always
include some form of adverse employment action. 35 Advocates of this
position reason that the General rule set forth in section (a) qualifies the term
“discriminate” with the phrase “in regard to” and then lists several forms of
employment-related actions; thus suggesting an adverse employment action
is a necessary part of every disability discrimination claim under the ADA.36
They contend that the subsections found under section (b) are forms of
discrimination, not to be divorced from the adverse employment action
requirement of the general rule in the preceding section.37
On the other hand, a more straightforward reading of the ADA leads
to the conclusion that no separate adverse action is necessary. One of the two
subsections relating to reasonable accommodations in the ADA, Section
12112(b)(5)(B), contains language suggesting that a specific adverse action,
denial of an employment opportunity, is necessary. Specifically, subsection
(B) prohibits “denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such
denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable
accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or
applicant[.]”38 However, the other reasonable accommodation subsection, §
12112(b)(5)(A) (i.e. the focus of this article), does not indicate that an
adverse action is necessary and creates an affirmative obligation for
32

12112(a).

2008 Amendments, Subsec. (a). Pub.L. 110-325, § 5(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. §

33

STATEMENT OF MANAGERS, 154 Cong. Rec. S8840-01, S8843, 2008 WL
4223414, at *10 (September 16, 2008); see infra text accompanying note 68 (comparing
failure to accommodate religion claims to failure to accommodate disability claims).
34
Id.
35
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 411–12 (N.J. 2010).
36
Id. at 411.
37
Id.
38
§ 12112(b)(5)(B).
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employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability.39 Not only
does such an interpretation provide a more logical reading of the statute as a
whole, it also harmonizes with the policy rationales behind the ADA.40
IV. EEOC REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE
The EEOC’s regulations and Interpretive Guidance on the ADA also
suggest an adverse employment action is not an element of a failure to
accommodate claim.41 It explains that one form of non-discrimination is the
obligation to make a reasonable accommodation.42 It follows that it is the
failure to fulfill this obligation that gives rise to liability. Likewise, the
EEOC’s enforcement guidance on failure to accommodate claims under the
ADA focuses on the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation,
whether an undue hardship exists, and the interactive process used to
determine the appropriate accommodation. 43 There is no mention of an
additional showing of a separate adverse employment action. 44 Likewise,
EEOC investigators are not instructed to consider whether there has been an
adverse employment action in assessing whether an employer has violated
the ADA by denying a reasonable accommodation.45 Thus, acknowledging
the failure to accommodate as a freestanding claim with its own distinct
elements, comports with the EEOC’s interpretation and guidance of this
statute.
On a related note, the EEOC takes the position in litigation that no
adverse employment action is necessary in failure to accommodate disability
cases.46 The EEOC has had mixed results with this position – for example,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted the district court strayed from the
reasonable accommodation test by requiring the EEOC to demonstrate an
adverse employment action and warned the court to avoid such a misstep on
remand.47 Yet, the Eighth Circuit rejected that same position submitted by
39

§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
See infra Section VI.
41
The EEOC’s interpretive guidance on Title I of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. app. 1630,
“while not controlling upon the courts by reason of [its] authority, do[es] constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.” Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 104 n.13 (2007) (citing
Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1995)).
42
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.9.
43
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.
html#N_38_; see also infra note 77 (discussing the interactive process) [hereinafter
Reasonable Accommodation].
44
See supra note 43, Reasonable Accommodation at Burdens of Proof.
45
See supra note 43, Reasonable Accommodation at Instructions for Investigators.
46
See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R. Co., No. 02-1479, 2002 WL 32375072, at
*17–18 (8th Cir. Apr. 30, 2002) (EEOC amicus brief).
47
E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
40
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the EEOC in an amicus brief and adopted defendant’s position to the
contrary.48
The EEOC’s approach on this issue places the focus on the proper
inquiries and should be consistently followed by courts.
V. DISAGREEMENT AMONGST COURTS
Surprisingly, relatively few cases have gone beyond a recitation of
the prima facie case into an analysis squarely addressing the issue of whether
a failure to accommodate claim actually requires a separate adverse
employment action.
One potential reason for the lack of case law on point is that
employees who have not suffered adverse employment actions are probably
less likely to bring a lawsuit. To this point, employees are generally hesitant
to sue their current employers.
Another potential reason for the shortage of case law on this issue is
that many employees who have not been reasonably accommodated quit
their jobs; thus, the issue before the court often focuses on whether the
plaintiff can establish constructive discharge, without even addressing
whether doing so is necessary to state a claim. Although sometimes pled as a
“separate count,” a constructive discharge action is not actually a cause of
action in and of itself.49 To establish a constructive discharge an employee
must show that his working conditions were intolerable such that a
“reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to
quit.”50 Sometimes a failure to accommodate can lead to circumstances that
meet this threshold showing. This will be particularly true where the failure
to accommodate is repeated or accompanied by discriminatory treatment of
the disabled employee. For example, the Sixth Circuit stated,
[A] complete failure to accommodate, in the face of repeated
requests, might suffice as evidence to show the
deliberateness necessary for constructive discharge. [ ] We
emphasize that our holding today does not pave the way for
an employee to assert a claim for constructive discharge
every time an employer fails to accommodate her disability.
But when an employee makes a repeated request for an
accommodation and that request is both denied and no other
reasonable alternative is offered, a jury may conclude that

48

Fenney, 2002 WL 32375072, at *17–18 (EEOC amicus brief); Fenney v.
Dakota, Minn. & E. R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (Order).
49
Kurtis A. Kemper, What Constitutes “Constructive Discharge” Under
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U. S.C. § 12101); 182 A.L.R. Fed. 609 (2002).
50
182 A.L.R. Fed. 609.
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However, in situations where the failure to accommodate may be
isolated and mundane (or even extreme), it may be difficult to meet the often
rigorous constructive discharge standard.52
When courts have been faced with the issue of whether an adverse
employment action is needed to establish a prima facie failure to
accommodate claim, they are split on the outcome. The minority insists upon
such a showing; while the majority does not.
A. Adverse Employment Action Needed
Some courts maintain that in a failure to accommodate disability
claim a plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered an adverse employment
action, specifically one that causes a material change in the terms or
conditions of employment.53
An understanding of Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029
(7th Cir. 1999), provides useful insight into this position. In Foster, an
employee with carpal tunnel syndrome was suspended and eventually fired
for allegedly failing to follow company attendance rules.54 Foster’s EEOC
charge alleged she was terminated because of her disability, yet she filed a
failure to accommodate claim, not a claim for disparate treatment. 55 It
appears that her failure to accommodate claim was based on the theory that
she would not have violated company procedures had her employer
accommodated her disability. In her case, the Seventh Circuit recited the law
as follows:
Accordingly, to state a prima facie case of "failure to
accommodate" disability discrimination, a plaintiff who has
51

Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1109 (6th Cir.
2008) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
52
For example, in Pagliaroni v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 04-C-1213, 2006 WL
2668157, at *8, 10 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2006), the court denied defendant’s motion for
summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim, holding she was not
required to prove an adverse employment action, but granted the motion with respect to
plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim, which was based on the allegation that she had to quit
because her employer failed to accommodate her disability. (As discussed above, constructive
discharge is not technically a separate claim. See supra text accompanying note 49.)
53
See e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 717 (8th Cir.
2003); see Hawkins v. Dale Med. Ctr., 1:05 CV 540 SRW, 2006 WL 1537228, at *8 n.5
(M.D. Ala. May 31, 2006); Bradley v. Fed. Express Corp., No. A-04-CA-718 AWA, 2006
WL 1751775 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2006). To be clear, Foster was not the first case to require
this element. See e.g., Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2001);
Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
54
Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999).
55
Id.
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suffered an adverse employment action must show that: (1)
she was or is disabled; (2) the defendant was aware of her
disability; (3) she was otherwise qualified for her job; and
(4) the disability caused the adverse employment action (a
factor which is implied if not stated)… Accordingly, to state
a prima facie case of disability discrimination for failure to
accommodate the disability, a plaintiff must demonstrate all
four of the elements listed above, including the claim that
she was discharged because of her disability.56
Because the defendant claimed it terminated Foster “because of her violation
of company policy, not because of her disability”, the court focused its
analysis on the phrase “because of” with respect to the fourth element.57
Other courts, even in other circuits, then relied on Foster’s recitation
of the elements of a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA.58 Soon it
became apparent that there was disagreement, especially in the Seventh
Circuit, regarding the proper elements of such a claim.59 Because the Foster
Court prefaced its recitation of the prima facie case with the phrase, “a
plaintiff who has suffered an adverse employment action must
show that ...” certain district court judges in that circuit began differentiating
between cases involving a plaintiff who had suffered an adverse employment
action, in which the Foster Court’s prima facie case applied, and those based
solely on a failure to accommodate.60 In 2010, the Seventh Circuit put the
issue to rest (hopefully) once and for all in that Circuit when it stated: “[T]he
[district] court appears to have mistakenly applied an element of the
disparate treatment test as part of its evaluation of reasonable
accommodation…No adverse employment action is required to prove a
failure to accommodate.”61
However, unlike the Seventh Circuit, some courts in other
jurisdictions have not carefully examined (or reexamined) the issue, and
continue to insist an adverse action is required.62
56

Id. at 1032–33 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1033.
58
See e.g., Fenney, 327 F.3d at 717; Bradley, 2006 WL 1751775, at *3; Hawkins,
2006 WL 1537228, at *8 n.5; Parker, 260 F.3d at 107-08; but see Scalera v. Electrograph
Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 352, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding Parker not
controlling because unlike Parker, Scalera did not allege she was fired because her employer
failed to provide a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed her to return to work).
59
See Kendra v. Principi, No. 02 C 3715, 2003 WL 21078039, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
May 13, 2003) (citing cases and noting disagreement).
60
Nichols v. Unison Indus., Inc., 99-C-50194, 2001 WL 849528 (N.D. Ill. July 24,
2001); Nawrot, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 722–23 (citing Foster, 168 F.3d at 1032).
61
E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2010).
62
See e.g., Rea v. Wal-Mart Store 1105, 419 F. App’x 700, 700–01 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citing Fenney, 327 F.3d at 717, which relied on Foster), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 407 (2011)
reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 807 (2011).
57
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B. No Adverse Employment Action Needed
On the other hand, the vast majority of courts correctly appreciate
that the failure to accommodate is itself an act of discrimination that violates
the ADA. Many have found employer liability notwithstanding the lack of an
adverse employment action 63 or have explained in dicta that an adverse
action would not be required. 64 Similarly, courts interpreting failure to
63

Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 771–72 (3d
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005) (reversing summary judgment for employer in
case involving police officer with depression whose requests for reassignment to
accommodate his disability were denied); Picard v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., 611 F. Supp.
2d 608, 610–12, 620 (E.D. La. 2009) (holding it was unnecessary to prove a separate adverse
employment action element in a failure to accommodate case in case where hospital
transcriptionist, who suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease,
resigned after being denied the use of voice-recognition software by her employer);
Richmond-Jeffers v. Porter Twp. Sch. Corp., 208-CV-278, 2012 WL 1714403, at *10–11
(N.D. Ind. May 14, 2012) (denying summary judgment on failure to accommodate claim
where employer allegedly failed to provide breaks to accommodate plaintiff’s disabilities);
Scalera v. Electrograph Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 352, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(stating there is no adverse employment element to plaintiff’s claim and holding fact issues
existed as to whether employer reasonably accommodated employee's Pompe Disease with the
five accommodations it allegedly provided); Harvey v. Wal-Mart La.L.L.C., 665 F. Supp. 2d
655, 670 (W.D. La. 2009) (denying summary judgment and noting adverse action was
irrelevant in case where employee with degenerative arthritis retired after being denied an
accommodation due to his discomfort standing up); Boice v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth.,
No. 05-4772, 2007 WL 2916188, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2007) (genuine issues of material
fact existed where employer refused employee’s request to remain on a day shift in order to
regulate his diabetes medication and refused his request to allow him to park closer to the
maintenance facility or be given access to a handicapped parking space to accommodate his
disabilities); Wade v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (E.D. Wis. 2006)
(denying summary judgment for employer where it failed to accommodate employee’s
occupational asthma when it failed to allow him to change his respirator daily); Pagliaroni v.
Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 04-C-1213, 2006 WL 2668157, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2006)
(denying summary judgment where employee with occupational asthma and anaphylaxis
alleged employer failed to transfer her to another “no vapor area” and failed to enforce its no
smoking policy); Brown v. City of N. Chicago, No. 04 C 1288, 2005 WL 475160, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 28, 2005) (denying motion to dismiss where employer failed to accommodate request
to assign employee with back problems and a serious heart condition to tasks that did not
violate his medical restriction regarding bending and lifting.); Nawrot, 259 F. Supp. 2d at
722–724 (denying motion for summary judgment on remand where diabetic employee’s
requests for breaks were refused, which caused him to suffered hypoglycemic attacks at work
causing collapse and altering his capacity to think clearly and act appropriately); Dudley v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. 3:99CV2634BC, 2001 WL 123673 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12,
2001) (denying summary judgment where custodial employee, who suffered from chronic
respiratory failure and asthmatic bronchitis, alleged failure to accommodate based on failure
to transfer her to another position, and noting that a lack of adverse action would not be fatal
to her claim).
64
See e.g., Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging that “it is perhaps arguable that the failure to accommodate an employee
standing alone may give rise to a claim under the ADA,” but failing to reach that question);
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 421–22 (N.J. 2010) (assuming a failure to accommodate a
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accommodate claims under the Rehabilitation Act, which adopts the ADA
standard,65 have also held that there is no requirement to demonstrate any
adverse action other than the failure to accommodate itself.66 Likewise, in
failure to accommodate religion cases under Title VII, plaintiffs are not
required to show adverse employment actions to state a claim.67 Some courts
have chosen to look to Title VII religious discrimination failure to
accommodate cases for guidance and, by analogy, have reasoned that
because no adverse employment action is required in Title VII religion cases,
none is required for ADA failure to accommodate cases.68
disability unaccompanied by an adverse employment consequence could be actionable under
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), but holding the plaintiff did not establish
prima facie case of failure to accommodate.) Although the New Jersey Supreme Court
ultimately declined to decide the issue in Victor, at least some New Jersey courts have
continued to insist that an “adverse employment action remains a required element of a prima
facie failure to accommodate case. See Alotto v. ECSM Util. Contractors, Inc., CIV.A. 091144, 2010 WL 5186127 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010); see also Durham v. Atl. City Elec. Co., CIV.
08-1120 RBK AMD, 2010 WL 3906673 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2010) (noting Victor decision was
irrelevant to case at hand where plaintiff clearly suffered a discrete adverse employment
decision, and discussion of adverse employment action in Victor was merely dicta).
65
The Rehabilitation Act provides, inter alia, that “no otherwise qualified
individual with a disability” may be discriminated against by a federal agency “solely by
reason of her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act also provides that the standards
governing employment discrimination claims applicable under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) apply to the Rehabilitation Act, id. § 794(d).
66
See e.g., Nadler v. Harvey, 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705 (11th Cir. Aug. 24,
2007) (stating prima facie case for failure to accommodate separately from prima facie case
for disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act); Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442
F.3d 1069, 1077 n.5 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir.
2004)); Edmonson v. Potter, 118 F. App’x 726, 728 (4th Cir. 2004) (reciting elements of
failure to accommodate separately from elements of disability discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act); Maine Human Rights Comm’n v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 370, 401 (D. Me. 2011) (analyzing claim under 5 M.R.S. § 4592(1)(C), failure to
provide auxiliary aids and services); Pantazes v. Jackson, No. 04-1056, 366 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67
n.2 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2005) (declining to grant summary judgment where defendant raised
for the first time lack of adverse employment action in its Reply, but noting that withholding
accommodations can itself constitute actionable discrimination).
67
Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the
basis of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, “unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j). “The intent and effect of [the] definition was to make it an unlawful employment
practice under § 703(a)(1) for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of
undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees and prospective employees.”
Nawrot, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
74 (1977)); see supra text accompanying note 34 (discussing Congressional Record, which
explains that the amendment to the ADA “mirror[s] the structure of nondiscrimination
protection provision in Title VII…”); but see Haliye v. Celestica Corp., 717 F. Supp. 2d
873, 876 n.2 (D. Minn. 2010) (citing Jones v. TEK Indus., Inc., 319 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir.
2003) (prima facie case of failure to accommodate [religion] requires proof that plaintiff was
disciplined for failing to comply with a conflicting employment requirement)).
68
In support of its conclusion that no separate adverse action is required in ADA
failure to accommodate cases, the Northern District of Illinois asserted that “ADA reasonable
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In the ADA context, there is some divergence regarding how courts
reach the conclusion that no separate adverse employment action is
necessary to state a failure to accommodate claim.
Some courts state that the failure to accommodate is itself an adverse
employment action.69 This is an unsound approach. Trying to categorize the
failure to reasonably accommodate as an “adverse employment action” in
order to use the standard disparate treatment prima facie case is like trying to
fit a square peg into a round hole. Although the definition of what constitutes
an adverse employment action has been interpreted broadly,70 the failure to
reasonably accommodate an employee does not logically fall within the
scope of the phrase’s meaning.
The more logical approach is to call a spade a spade. The failure to
accommodate is not an adverse action, nor is an adverse action required to
state a claim. This has been said effectively in a number of ways. Certain
courts just blatantly state that the failure to accommodate is itself an act of
discrimination. 71 Others courts acknowledge – either by explicitly stating
such or by providing separate prima facie cases – that a disability
discrimination case may be proved either by showing that the plaintiff

accommodation claims are nearly identical to the corresponding Title VII section.” Nawrot,
259 F. Supp. 2d at 724. On the other hand, others have declined to look to Title VII for
guidance on whether the ADA requires an adverse action in failure to accommodate cases
because of perceived differences between Title VII and ADA failure to accommodate cases.
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 404 n.6 (N.J. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Stephen F. Befort,
Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 931, 935 n.18 (2003) (distinguishing between reasonable accommodation requirements
in Title VII and in ADA).
69
See e.g., Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751,
761 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005) (“Adverse employment decisions in this
context include refusing to make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.”);
Braheny v. Pa., No. 10-3536, 2012 WL 176186, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2012) (quoting
Williams); Reifer v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, 462 F. Supp. 2d 621, 634, 636 (M.D. Pa.
2006) (noting “an ‘adverse employment decision’ includes an employer’s failure to
accommodate, reasonably, the employee’s disability”, but granting summary judgment
because plaintiff could not show that she was a qualified individual or that the defendant
failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process); Boice v. Se. Pa. Transp. Authority,
No. 05-4772, 2007 WL 2916188, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2007) (quoting Reifer, 462 F. Supp.
2d at 634).
70
See supra text accompanying notes 15 and 24 (explaining adverse employment
action standard in discrimination and retaliation cases under Title VII and the ADA).
71
Wade v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (E.D. Wis. 2006)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)) (“[T]he failure to accommodate is itself an act of
discrimination that violates the ADA…A plaintiff alleging a claim for failure to accommodate
is not required to allege an adverse employment action.”); Pagliaroni v. Daimler Chrysler
Corp., No. 04-C-1213, 2006 WL 2668157, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2006) (quoting and
following Wade, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1045).
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suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability or that her
employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation.72
VI. PUBLIC POLICY
There are strong public policy reasons why the failure to reasonably
accommodate an employee’s disability should be a stand-alone claim that
does not require an adverse employment action.
First of all, recognizing that a failure to accommodate an employee’s
disability is a freestanding cause of action (sans an adverse action), will put
teeth in the ADA. As noted in the Interpretive Guidance: “The reasonable
accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers
to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability are
removed or alleviated.”73 If there are no consequences for failing to remove
such barriers, the policy behind the ADA will largely go ignored. Magistrate
Judge Norton Denlow of the Northern District of Illinois provided a strong
rational on this point:
[Defendant’s] construction of the ADA subsections creates
employer liability only if the employee suffered an adverse
employment action because of his disability. Under this
construction an employer would not be liable in situations
where known disabilities are not accommodated simply for
management's laziness or cost benefit analysis. The ADA
72
See e.g., Mzyk v. N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 F. App’x 13, 15–16 (5th Cir.
2010) (reciting elements of disparate treatment and failure to accommodate disability claims
separately); Drozdowski v. Northland Lincoln Mercury, 321 F. App’x 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“plaintiff can establish a discrimination case under the ADA by proving that his employer
either took adverse action against him because of his disability or failed to make reasonable
accommodations for his known disabilities”); Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484
F.3d 91, 101–102 (1st Cir. 2007) (analyzing disparate treatment claims separately from failure
to accommodate claims); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)
(final element of prima facie case requires plaintiff to prove “he was discriminated against
because of his disability…An employer unlawfully discriminates against a qualified
individual with a disability when the employer fails to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’
for the disability-unless doing so would impose undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a).” (internal citation omitted); Haines v. Cherokee
County, 1:08-CV-2916-JOF/AJB, 2010 WL 2821853 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2010) (reciting the
final element generically as requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that the “defendant unlawfully
discriminated against [her] because of the disability,” and explaining how disparate treatment
and failure to accommodate cases are each proved, but finding plaintiff’s claim failed because
she did not request an accommodation), report and recommendation adopted as modified,
1:08-CV-02916-JOF, 2010 WL 2821780 (N.D. Ga. July 15, 2010); Nawrot, 259 F. Supp. 2d
at 722–724 (recognizing that “an ADA claim can be based on an adverse action because of the
disability or a failure to accommodate”); Dudley v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.
3:99CV2634BC, 2001 WL 123673 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2001) (“[A] discrimination claim
under the ADA may be based on the employer’s discriminatory adverse action; i.e.,
terminating or demoting an individual because of his disability, or on the employer’s failure to
provide the employee with a reasonable accommodation.”) (internal citation omitted).
73
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA 29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630.9.
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requires employers to accommodate employee[s’]
disabilities whether or not the failure to do so is based on
some discriminatory animosity toward the employee[s’]
disability. [Defendant] cannot escape liability under the
ADA just because its failure to accommodate did not result
in an adverse employment action to [Plaintiff].74
Secondly, recognizing it as its own claim with its proper elements
would eliminate the constructive discharge conundrum. If a separate adverse
action were required to sustain a failure to accommodate case, it is
foreseeable that some employers, either of their own accord or upon the
advice of legal counsel, would refrain from taking any separate adverse
action against employees who they have failed to accommodate. Many
employees would be left with the choice of remaining employed by a
company that refused to (and potentially continues to refuse to)
accommodate them and having no legal recourse or “resigning” and arguing
constructive discharge, which may or may not succeed in court. Neither
option is good; the law should not force such a choice.
Third, there are still built-in protections to prevent and weed out
meritless claims. Employers will likely argue that recognizing the failure to
accommodate as a stand-alone claim absent an adverse action will open up
the floodgates to litigation. Such scare tactics are nonsense. The ADA and
the economic realities of lawsuits provide protections to defeat meritless
claims. Absent wage loss or extreme emotional distress,75 employees (and
plaintiffs’ employment lawyers) will not find it financially worthwhile to
bring a lawsuit every time a failure to accommodate occurs. While the ADA
is a fee-shifting statute, which permits reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to
be recovered by a prevailing plaintiff,76 there still exists little incentive for
attorneys to take run-of-the-mill failure to accommodate claims given that
most cases settle and, even if the plaintiff prevails at trial, the plaintiff may
not be able to recover all of her fees and costs.
Moreover, properly recognizing the failure to accommodate as a
separate theory of discrimination does not mean that every request for
accommodation that is not granted will trigger automatic liability. The
74

Nawrot, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
The following remedies are available under the ADA: preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief, backpay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages,
liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of litigation. Elizabeth O’Connor Tomlinson,
Cause of Action for Failure to Make Reasonable in Workplace Under Americans with
Disabilities Act, 48 CAUSES OF ACTION 137, § 30 (updated Aug. 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
76
“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this
chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12205. The applicable standards to governing attorney’s fees awards under the ADA are the
same as those that apply to other civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 706(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
75
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parties have a mutual obligation to engage in the interactive process in good
faith.77 For example, in Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., the Fifth Circuit failed
to reach the issue of whether the failure to accommodate an employee
standing alone may give rise to a claim under the ADA because it ruled that
the employer had not refused to reasonably accommodate the employee.78
Instead, the court reasoned that by quitting, the employee had caused a
breakdown in the interactive process.79
Additionally, the ADA specifically provides for the following
affirmative defenses: direct threat (42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)); religious entity
(42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1)); infectious or communicable disease (42 U.S.C. §
12113(e)(2)); illegal use of drugs (42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)); undue hardship (42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)); and employment qualification standard, test or
selection criterion that is job-related and consistent with business necessity
(42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)).
VII. CONCLUSION
The plain language of the statute, well-reasoned jurisprudence, and
public policy all lead to the conclusion that failure to reasonably
accommodate claims under the ADA do not require an adverse employment
action. If an employee can demonstrate he is disabled, qualified, and that his
employer failed to reasonably accommodate him, he has stated a claim. To
the extent the employee further asserts that the failure to accommodate led to
an adverse employment action (for example, a constructive discharge), the
fact-finder should determine whether such causation exists. The inquiry
should not be whether he suffered an adverse action because of his disability
(that is a disparate treatment issue), but rather whether the failure to
reasonably accommodate him resulted in an adverse action. If there is no
causation between the failure to accommodate and the adverse employment

77

“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may
be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process
with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.”
29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630 (“Process of Determining the Appropriate Reasonable
Accommodation”). To demonstrate that the employer failed to participate in the process, the
employee must prove that “(1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; (2) the
employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; (3) the employer
did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations; and (4)
the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good
faith.” Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 1999); see also John
R. Autry, Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA: Are Employers Required to
Participate in the Interactive Process? The Courts Say "Yes" but the Law Says "No", 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 665, 677 (2004).
78
178 F.3d at 734–35.
79
Id.
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action, this would not undermine his ability to state a claim; 80 it would,
however, likely affect his ability to recover certain damages, such as wage
loss.
Thus, for failure to reasonably accommodate cases arising under the
ADA, parties and courts should: (1) label the claim properly, i.e. “Failure to
Reasonably Accommodate Plaintiff under the ADA” or something to that
effect; (2) list it as its own count; 81 (3) lay out the prima facie elements
clearly;82 and (4) analyze this claim separately from other potential disability
claims/theories of liability (for example, disparate impact, disparate
treatment, retaliation, or hostile work environment, and disability claims
asserted under state law).
Getting the law right on this issue will result in truly removing and
alleviating barriers to the equal employment opportunity of individuals with
disabilities.83

80

See e.g., Scalera v. Electrograph Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 352, 361–62
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting no proof of causal connection required where, although plaintiff was
terminated, her disability discrimination claim was premised solely on allegation that
employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation).
81
See Solomon v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, No. 10-3221, 2012 WL 831959, at
*6–12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2012) (combining plaintiff’s allegations based on a failure to
accommodate theory as one count, and her allegations based on a disparate treatment theory as
a separate count).
82
See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating the
elements as: (1) that he was an individual who had a disability within the meaning of the
statute; (2) that the employer had notice of his disability; (3) that with reasonable
accommodation he could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) that the
employer refused to make such accommodations.
83
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (stating that the reasonable
accommodation requirement helps remove barriers for individuals who are disabled).
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